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Issue 1

COURT REPORTS

Willowbrook Farms LLP v. Dep't of Ecology, 66 P.3d 664 (Wash. Ct.
App. 2003) (holding that correction of an incomplete legal description
in a water rights claim constituted an amendment to correct a
ministerial mistake, where the claimant had a mandatory duty to
complete the form correctly).
The State of Washington's 1967 water rights registration and
relinquishment act required those claiming water rights predating the
1917 water code to register their claim with the Department of Water
Failure to
Resources, the Department of Ecology's predecessor.
register before July 1974 constituted waiver. A 1987 statute allowed
amendment to a water rights claim for, among two other reasons, a
In 1973, Paul Harrel, Willowbrook Farms'
ministerial mistake.
predecessor in interest, filed a water rights claim on a state form.
When filing the form, Harrel incorrectly described his "place of use"
and failed to describe the entire field he irrigated. Later, Willowbrook
Farms discovered Harrel's mistake and amended the claim form,
adding the omitted section. The Department of Ecology ("Ecology")
rejected the amendment. Willowbrook appealed to the Pollution
Control Hearings Board, and the board granted Ecology's motion for
summaryjudgment. Willowbrook then appealed to the Kittitas County
Superior Court. The superior court reversed. Ecology appealed to the
Washington Court of Appeals and argued that since Harrel
deliberately wrote the legal description, he made an erroneous choice,
not a ministerial mistake.
Using de novo standard of review, the court concluded that
because determining what constitutes "ministerial" when filing a
required government form did not require the administration board's
expertise, the court retained ultimate authority to interpret the statute.
The statute did not define the word "ministerial." Looking to prior
case law, the court noted, "[a]n act is ministerial if the individual is
performing a duty that is mandatory for the person to perform and
there is no discretion in how the act is performed." The court also
noted, "If a ministerial act is performed improperly.. . there is a duty
to correct the error... correction of the error is itself a ministerial
act." The court reasoned that concluding Harrel made a ministerial
error meant concluding he did not make ajudgment error. If Harrel
made a judgment error, then he elected to claim only a portion of the
field he irrigated. This would have made his claim incorrect in other
ways because he would not have irrigated the number of acres he
stated, and he would not have had a valid claim for the amount of
water he claimed to use. Because Harrel correctly identified the field
regarding both acreage and quantity of water, the court held Harrel
did not make a judgment error. Therefore, by logical necessity, when
Harrel filled out the incorrect legal description, he made a clerical
error. Hence, seeking to amend the incorrect legal description was
ministerial. The court explained their interpretation fit nicely within
the statutory scheme, which seemed to contemplate inexact or
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incomplete information and allow amendment for resolving
imperfections.
Since the 1987 statute contained three subsections, each
describing when to allow amendment, Ecology asked the court to
apply the statutory construction canon of ejusdem generis. The court
declined because employing the canon required finding the other two
subsections identified a class of amendments, and no class existed.
Elizabeth Frost

WISCONSIN
Howe v. Neenah Springs, Inc., 02-1657, 2003 Wisc. App. LEXIS 940
(Wisc. Ct. App. Oct. 2, 2003) (affirming ajudgment of the trial court
that a bottler of water was not required to make royalty payments to
well owners for the bottling of their well water upon learning that the
well on the owners' former property did not confirm to applicable
governmental regulations).
In 1988, J. Ronald and Janice Howe ("Howes") built a bottling
operation to package and sell drinking water from a well located on
their property, and then sold the bottling operation and real estate to
Alvin Klawitter. Pursuant to the sale agreement ("1988 Agreement"),
the Howes would receive twenty years of royalty payments based on the
amount of water sold. The Howes kept a mortgage on the property to
secure royalty payments. In 1991, Klawitter sold the property to
Neenah Springs, Inc. ("Neenah") and they amended the royalty
agreement on March 28, 1991 ("1991 Agreement"). Under this new
agreement, Neenah's obligation to pay royalties to the Howes
immediately terminated "in the event the supply of water from the well
stops or if water directly from the well does not meet standards for
bottled water of the FDA or any other applicable governmental
authority." In 1997, a Wisconsin state official found that the Howes'
well did not meet the state's Department of Natural Resources
("DNR") requirements for high-capacity wells. Instead of risking
sanctions by using the old well, Neenah decided to drill a new well and
ceased paying royalty payments to the Howes on March 1, 1999,
because it was no longer bottling water from their well. The new well
water, however, came from the same aquifer.
In March of 2000, the Howes sued Neenah in the Circuit Court for
Marquette County, Tennessee, alleging three causes of action for
breach of contract. First, the Howes claimed that Neenah could not
terminate its obligations under the royalty agreement because the
water quality from the existing well complied with applicable DNR
standards that applied to water discharged at a slower rate. More
stringent state government standards applied to water from highcapacity wells. Second, the Howes argued that Neenah owed them

